Scheduling with package auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Scheduling with package auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1198.91059
author: Kan Takeuchi
author: John C. Lin
author: Yan Chen
author: Thomas A. Finholt
published in: Experimental Economics
publication date: 2010-11-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
zbMATH DE Number: 5816283
zbMATH Keywords: package auctions
zbMATH Keywords: scheduling
zbMATH Keywords: experiments
Wikidata QID: Q57834532
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10683-010-9252-6
OpenAlex ID: W2070631019
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cites work: An experimental examination into the design of decentralized methods to solve the assignment problem with and without money
DOI: 10.1007/S10683-010-9252-6
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5816283