Double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and ex-post equilibria with private values
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and ex-post equilibria with private values
zbMATH Open document ID: 1521.91096
author: Makoto Hagiwara
publication date: 2023-08-29T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: DP2019-13.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B03
zbMATH DE Number: 7732366
zbMATH Keywords: double implementation
zbMATH Keywords: dominant strategy equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: ex-post equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: weak secure-strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: private values
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2954084478
cites work: Robust Mechanism Design
cites work: Ex post implementation
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DOI: 10.1515/BEJTE-2021-0115
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published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7732366