Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents
zbMATH Open document ID: 1203.91083
author: Alia Gizatulina
author: Martin Hellwig
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2011-01-13T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 5835712
zbMATH Keywords: surplus extraction
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: BDP
zbMATH Keywords: informational smallness
zbMATH Keywords: correlated information
zbMATH Keywords: universal type space
zbMATH Keywords: public goods
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2010.07.007
OpenAlex ID: W3125226427
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2010.07.007
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5835712