Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity
zbMATH Open document ID: 1274.91370
author: Roland Pongou
author: Bertrand Tchantcho
author: Lawrence Diffo Lambo
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 2011-02-03T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: MPRA paper 18240.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 5844664
zbMATH Keywords: level-based influence relations
zbMATH Keywords: global influence relation
zbMATH Keywords: multi-choice institutions
zbMATH Keywords: paradox of power
zbMATH Keywords: cyclicity
zbMATH Keywords: anonymity
zbMATH Keywords: transitivity
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2025974367
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DOI: 10.1007/S11238-010-9211-X
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5844664