Perfect implementation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Perfect implementation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1205.91038
author: Sergei Izmalkov
author: Matt Lepinski
author: Silvio Micali
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2011-02-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 5850272
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: trust
zbMATH Keywords: privacy
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2010.05.003
OpenAlex ID: W4250821943
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2010.05.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5850272