Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1252.91001
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6
author: William V. Gehrlein
author: Dominique Lepelley
published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2011-03-11T00:00:00Z
review text: On the one hand there is the theoretical literature giving many examples of voting situations in which a particular voting mechanism yields a counterintuitive outcome, Condorcet's paradox being the most famous of these paradoxical results. On the other hand there are many empirical studies pointing out that these paradoxes hardly occur in practical voting situations. The goal of the authors throughout their book is to integrate the theoretical results obtained from formal probability representations with empirical results from other studies. Their overall conclusion is that `while Borda Rule is not always the most effective voting rule for selecting the Pairwise Majority Rule Winner in all scenarios, it is resistant to the potential problem of performing very poorly. Moreover, scenarios do exist for all other common voting rules in which the possible outcome of very poor performance is a significant issue.' In Chapter 1 a number of voting paradoxes (among which Condorcet's, Borda's, no show, Ostrogorski's), are introduced and empirical studies are summarized to indicate that some of the most common paradoxes are relatively unlikely to be observed in actual elections. The authors use several conditions, Dual Culture, Impartial Culture, Impartial Anonymous Culture and Maximal Culture to obtain representations for the probability that voting events will be observed and use these mathematical models to suggest that voting paradoxes should become less likely as voters' preferences exhibit greater degrees of homogeneity, or as voters' preferences on candidates become more statistically dependent. In Chapter 2 the authors focus on the association between the likelihood that a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner exists and degrees of social homogeneity, where they distinguish between Population Specific Measures of Homogeneity and Situation Specific Measures of Homogeneity. They conclude among others that `Condorcet's paradox should very rarely be observed in any real elections o…
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91-02
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 5865107
zbMATH Keywords: voting paradoxes
zbMATH Keywords: group coherence
zbMATH Keywords: Condorcet efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: voting rules
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6
OpenAlex ID: W2493647195
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5865107