Environmental policy and stable collusion: the case of a dynamic polluting oligopoly
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Environmental policy and stable collusion: the case of a dynamic polluting oligopoly
zbMATH Open document ID: 1209.91119
author: Hassan Benchekroun
author: Amrita Ray Chaudhuri
publication date: 2011-03-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B76
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B64
zbMATH DE Number: 5869227
zbMATH Keywords: pollution tax
zbMATH Keywords: oligopoly
zbMATH Keywords: cartel formation
zbMATH Keywords: coalition formation
zbMATH Keywords: differential game
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jedc.2010.12.003
OpenAlex ID: W2006513986
cites work: Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
cites work: Q4328564
cites work: On merger profitability in a Cournot setting
cites work: Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
cites work: SUSTAINABILITY OF COOPERATION OVERTIME IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
cites work: Time consistent side payments in a dynamic game of downstream pollution
cites work: Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction
DOI: 10.1016/J.JEDC.2010.12.003
published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5869227