Location of response facilities: a simultaneous game between state and terrorist
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Location of response facilities: a simultaneous game between state and terrorist
zbMATH Open document ID: 1207.91019
DOI: 10.1504/IJOR.2011.037265
author: Oded Berman
author: Arieh Gavious
author: Rongbing Huang
published in: International Journal of Operational Research
publication date: 2011-03-14T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: We study a simultaneous move game with two players: a terrorist and a state where the latter installs facilities that provide support in case of a terrorist attack. While the state installs the facilities such that the metropolitan area attacked is the one that minimises her disutility (i.e. minimises ``loss''), the terrorist, who is not aware of the location of the facilities, attacks one of the metropolitan areas to maximise his utility. An analytic solution for some specific network structure is introduced. Numerically, we solve the problem for a case study of the 20 largest metropolitan areas in the USA.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 5865729
zbMATH Keywords: facilities location
zbMATH Keywords: terrorists
zbMATH Keywords: game theory
zbMATH Keywords: simultaneous games
describes a project that uses: Gambit
MaRDI profile type: Publication
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5865729