Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1213.91027
author: Maria Montero
author: Juan J. Vidal-Puga
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2011-03-28T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper studies a majoritarian bargaining model in which players make payoff demand in decreasing order of voting weight. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is such that the minimal winning coalition of the players that move first forms with payoffs proportional to the voting weights. This result advances previous analysis in terms of one or more of: the simplicity of the extensive form; the range of the majority games covered; the equilibrium concept.
reviewed by: Klaus Ehemann
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 5870960
zbMATH Keywords: demand bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: coalition formation
zbMATH Keywords: weighted majority games
zbMATH Keywords: minimal winning coalitions
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2010.05.004
OpenAlex ID: W1965626473
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2010.05.004
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5870960