Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship
zbMATH Open document ID: 1208.91078
author: Jörg Budde
author: Matthias Kräkel
published in: Journal of Economics
publication date: 2011-03-30T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
zbMATH DE Number: 5871626
zbMATH Keywords: moral hazard
zbMATH Keywords: limited liability
zbMATH Keywords: risk-incentive relationship
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00712-010-0183-7
OpenAlex ID: W2056238991
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DOI: 10.1007/S00712-010-0183-7
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5871626