Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence
zbMATH Open document ID: 1255.91040
author: Johannes Hörner
author: Stefano Lovo
author: Tristan Tomala
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2011-10-28T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: d1739.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
zbMATH DE Number: 5965258
zbMATH Keywords: repeated game with incomplete information
zbMATH Keywords: Harsanyi doctrine
zbMATH Keywords: belief-free equilibria
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2011.06.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5965258