On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1278.91012
author: Felix Brandt
author: Markus Brill
author: Felix Fischer
author: Paul Harrenstein
published in: Theory of Computing Systems
publication date: 2011-11-23T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68Q17
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68Q25
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 5977799
zbMATH Keywords: constant-sum games
zbMATH Keywords: solutions concepts
zbMATH Keywords: iterated weak dominance
zbMATH Keywords: computational complexity
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00224-010-9282-7
OpenAlex ID: W4240401627
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DOI: 10.1007/S00224-010-9282-7
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5977799