Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
zbMATH Open document ID: 1235.91062
author: Alexander Reffgen
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2011-11-23T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 5977829
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-010-0479-0
OpenAlex ID: W2044854382
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-010-0479-0
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5977829