Referenda as a catch-22
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Referenda as a catch-22
zbMATH Open document ID: 1235.91156
author: Dimitrios Xefteris
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2011-11-23T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 5977833
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-010-0483-4
OpenAlex ID: W2111632081
cites work: Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information
cites work: Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
cites work: The welfare effects of public opinion polls
cites work: Q5787677
DOI: 10.1007/S00355-010-0483-4
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5977833