A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research
zbMATH Open document ID: 1235.91155
author: Daniel F. Stone
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2011-11-30T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 5982675
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-010-0496-z
OpenAlex ID: W2081165607
cites work: Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
cites work: Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
cites work: Strategic Information Transmission
cites work: Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure
cites work: A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
cites work: On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
cites work: Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
cites work: When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
DOI: 10.1007/S00355-010-0496-Z
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5982675