Bidding in common-value auctions with an unknown number of competitors
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Bidding in common-value auctions with an unknown number of competitors
zbMATH Open document ID: 1541.91109
author: Stephan Lauermann
author: Andre Speit
published in: Econometrica
publication date: 2024-05-13T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 7846156
zbMATH Keywords: common-value auctions
zbMATH Keywords: random player games
zbMATH Keywords: numbers uncertainty
zbMATH Keywords: Poisson games
zbMATH Keywords: endogenous tie-breaking
zbMATH Keywords: nonexistence
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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DOI: 10.3982/ECTA17793
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7846156