Platform design when sellers use pricing algorithms
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Platform design when sellers use pricing algorithms
zbMATH Open document ID: 1541.91096
author: Justin P. Johnson
author: Andrew Rhodes
author: Q6108955
published in: Econometrica
publication date: 2024-05-13T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68T05
zbMATH DE Number: 7846225
zbMATH Keywords: algorithms
zbMATH Keywords: collusion
zbMATH Keywords: platform design
zbMATH Keywords: prominence
zbMATH Keywords: Q-learning
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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DOI: 10.3982/ECTA19978
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7846225