Aggregation of multiple prior opinions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Aggregation of multiple prior opinions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1239.91031
author: Hervé Crès
author: Itzhak Gilboa
author: Nicolas Vieille
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2011-12-28T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 111cres-giloboa-vieille.pdf
review text: The authors consider a decision maker who is confronted with \(n\) experts having different prior sets of beliefs. There is a set \(\Lambda\) of weight vectors over the experts. The decision maker evaluates each act according to the maximin expected utility (MEU) model by Gilboa and Schmeidler. The experts adopt the decision maker's utility function (!). The authors prove the equivalence of two evaluation procedures: 1) The decision maker knows the sets of prior beliefs \(C_i\) of the experts and evaluates an act according to MEU with a set of probabilities derived from \(\Lambda\) and \(C_i\). 2) The experts only report their minimal (bottom-line) evaluation of an act and the decision maker uses \(\Lambda\) and these evaluations for the MEU-evaluation. Moreover the authors prove that these are equivalent to a condition called `Expert Uncertainty Aversion' (EUA). If each expert evaluates an act above the weighted average of the evaluations of others acts, so should the decision maker.
reviewed by: Peter Kischka
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B16
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 62C10
zbMATH DE Number: 5992529
zbMATH Keywords: multiple prior
zbMATH Keywords: maximum expected utility
zbMATH Keywords: expert uncertainty aversion
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2570919071
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2011.06.018
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5992529