A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies
zbMATH Open document ID: 1229.91115
author: Takashi Kunimoto
author: Roberto Serrano
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2011-12-28T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2004
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 5992530
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: exact and approximate implementation
zbMATH Keywords: iteratively undominated strategies
zbMATH Keywords: restricted deception-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: incentive compatibility
zbMATH Keywords: measurability
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3123683907
cites work: Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
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cites work: Rationalizable implementation
cites work: Q4365156
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cites work: Virtual Bayesian Implementation
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cites work: Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
cites work: A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
cites work: Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2011.02.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5992530