Sensitivity analysis for a dynamic macroeconomic policy game in a monetary union
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Sensitivity analysis for a dynamic macroeconomic policy game in a monetary union
author: D. Blueschke
author: V. Blueschke-Nikolaeva
author: Reinhard Neck
published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research
publication date: 2024-06-20T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90Bxx
zbMATH DE Number: 7868425
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic games
zbMATH Keywords: feedback Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto solution
zbMATH Keywords: sensitivity analysis
zbMATH Keywords: monetary union
zbMATH Keywords: public debt
zbMATH Keywords: coalitions
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Should fiscal policies be centralized in a monetary union? A dynamic game approach
cites work: OPTGAME3: A Dynamic Game Solver and an Economic Example
cites work: The political business cycle if the government is not myopic
DOI: 10.1007/S10100-024-00907-2
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7868425