Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
author: Özgün Ekici
published in: Theoretical Economics
publication date: 2024-07-02T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91-XX
zbMATH DE Number: 7874767
zbMATH Keywords: indivisible object
zbMATH Keywords: pair efficient
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proof
zbMATH Keywords: individually rational
zbMATH Keywords: top trading cycles
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: House allocation with existing tenants
cites work: A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
cites work: A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
cites work: Bilateral Trading Processes, Pairwise Optimally, and Pareto Optimality
cites work: Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
cites work: Pairwise, t-Wise, and Pareto Optimalities
cites work: Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
cites work: Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
cites work: An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
cites work: Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
cites work: Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
cites work: Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
cites work: Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
cites work: An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
cites work: On cores and indivisibility
cites work: House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
cites work: Queue allocation of indivisible goods
cites work: Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
DOI: 10.3982/TE5471
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7874767