Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records
zbMATH Open document ID: 1274.91162
author: Eyal Baharad
author: Jacob Goldberger
author: Shmuel Nitzan
author: Moshe Koppel
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 2012-01-13T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: cesifo1 wp3323.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
zbMATH DE Number: 5997571
zbMATH Keywords: simple majority rule
zbMATH Keywords: Condorcet
zbMATH Keywords: voting record
zbMATH Keywords: optimal aggregation rule
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3121841985
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DOI: 10.1007/S11238-010-9240-5
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5997571