Professor Peter Sudhölter (1957--2024)
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Professor Peter Sudhölter (1957--2024)
zbMATH Open document ID: 1542.0103
author: Michel Grabisch
author: Hervé Moulin
author: José M. Zarzuelo
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2024-08-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 01A70
zbMATH DE Number: 7890766
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Homogeneous games as anti step functions
cites work: Implementing the modified LH algorithm
cites work: The nucleolus of homogeneous games with steps
cites work: Q4296868
cites work: Directed and weighted majority games
cites work: The Modified Nucleolus as Canonical Representation of Weighted Majority Games
cites work: Star-shapedness of the kernel for homogeneous games
cites work: An axiomatization of Nash equilibria in economic situations
cites work: The modified nucleolus: Properties and axiomatizations
cites work: Q3840258
cites work: Nucleoli as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions
cites work: Axiomatizations of game theoretical solutions for one-output cost sharing problems
cites work: Q4495233
cites work: Airport problems and consistent allocation rules.
cites work: The canonical extensive form of a game form. II: Representation
cites work: The positive prekernel of a cooperative game
cites work: Axiomatizations of the core on the universal domain and other natural domains
cites work: The semireactive bargaining set of a cooperative game
cites work: A Note on an Axiomatization of the Core of Market Games
cites work: Formation of cartels in glove markets and the modiclus.
cites work: Q4433627
cites work: Reconfirming the Prenucleolus
cites work: Cartels via the modiclus.
cites work: On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set
cites work: The modiclus and core stability
cites work: Advances in dynamic games. Applications to economics, management science, engineering, and environmental management
cites work: The Shapley value of exact assignment games
cites work: Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games
cites work: On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability
cites work: The positive core of a cooperative game
cites work: Sequential legislative lobbying
cites work: Nonsymmetric variants of the prekernel and the prenucleolus
cites work: The bounded core for games with precedence constraints
cites work: Extending the Nash solution to choice problems with reference points
cites work: The prenucleolus and the prekernel for games with communication structures
cites work: On extensions of the core and the anticore of transferable utility games
cites work: On the restricted cores and the bounded core of games on distributive lattices
cites work: Determinacy of equilibrium in outcome game forms
cites work: On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games
cites work: Characterizations of the core of TU and NTU games with communication structures
cites work: Characterizations of solutions for games with precedence constraints
cites work: Axiomatizations of symmetrically weighted solutions
cites work: Characterizations of highway toll pricing methods
cites work: On a class of vertices of the core
cites work: Decomposing bivariate dominance for social welfare comparisons
cites work: Generic finiteness of equilibrium distributions for bimatrix outcome game forms
cites work: Monotonicity and Weighted Prenucleoli: A Characterization Without Consistency
cites work: Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex games
cites work: Constrained welfare egalitarianism in surplus-sharing problems
cites work: Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games
cites work: Hart-Mas-Colell consistency and the core in convex games
cites work: Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness
cites work: Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency
cites work: Average monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility
cites work: Remarks on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split
cites work: Minimal balanced collections and their application to core stability and other topics of game theory
cites work: Bezalel Peleg: a bibliography
cites work: Comments on: ``Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities''
cites work: Preface
cites work: Q3995340
DOI: 10.1007/S00182-024-00903-5
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7890766