Social equity in international environmental agreements
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Social equity in international environmental agreements
author: Chiara Donnini
author: Armando Sacco
published in: Journal of Global Optimization
publication date: 2024-09-17T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B76
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
zbMATH DE Number: 7914904
zbMATH Keywords: international environmental agreements
zbMATH Keywords: social equity
zbMATH Keywords: envy-freeness
zbMATH Keywords: non-cooperative games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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DOI: 10.1007/S10898-024-01368-2
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7914904