Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_3
author: Ahmad Awde
author: Mostapha Diss
author: Eric Kamwa
author: Julien Yves Rolland
author: Abdelmonaim Tlidi
publication date: 2024-11-13T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 7943414
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7943414