Restricted feedback in long term relationships
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Restricted feedback in long term relationships
zbMATH Open document ID: 1258.91030
author: Ulrich Doraszelski
author: Juan F. Escobar
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2012-03-05T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://repository.upenn.edu/bepp_papers/133
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 6012117
zbMATH Keywords: repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: restricted feedback
zbMATH Keywords: product choice game
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2166973609
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2011.11.013
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6012117