Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
zbMATH Open document ID: 1258.91088
author: Antonio Miralles
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2012-03-05T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6012119
zbMATH Keywords: nontransfer mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: allocation
zbMATH Keywords: private information
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2011.11.002
OpenAlex ID: W1980278279
cites work: Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
cites work: A new solution to the random assignment problem.
cites work: Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
cites work: Coordination in auctions with entry
cites work: Storable votes
cites work: Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
cites work: Incentives in Teams
cites work: Inefficiencies on linking decisions
cites work: Simultaneous auctions with synergies
cites work: An optimal auction for complements
cites work: Q4902563
cites work: Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions
cites work: Optimal Auction Design
cites work: A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
cites work: Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. II: Positional voting
cites work: Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2011.11.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6012119