Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates
zbMATH Open document ID: 1392.91062
author: Jean-François Laslier
author: Karine van der Straeten
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2018-02-02T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: wp 201608.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 6833897
zbMATH Keywords: strategic voting
zbMATH Keywords: multi-winner election
zbMATH Keywords: approval balloting
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2340055689
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-016-0983-Y
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6833897