Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
zbMATH Open document ID: 1392.91109
author: Tomoya Kazumura
author: Shigehiro Serizawa
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2018-02-02T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
zbMATH DE Number: 6833900
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: multi-demand preferences
zbMATH Keywords: unit-demand preferences
zbMATH Keywords: non-quasi-linear preferences
zbMATH Keywords: minimum price Walrasian rule
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-016-0986-8
OpenAlex ID: W2252361264
Wikidata QID: Q59471729
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-016-0986-8
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6833900