Non-bossiness
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Non-bossiness
zbMATH Open document ID: 1392.91111
author: William Thomson
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2018-02-02T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 6833901
zbMATH Keywords: non-bossiness
zbMATH Keywords: allocation rule
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-016-0987-7
OpenAlex ID: W4243133889
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-016-0987-7
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6833901