Symmetric mechanism design
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Symmetric mechanism design
zbMATH Open document ID: 1388.91095
author: Yaron Azrieli
author: Ritesh Jain
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2018-02-09T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6836914
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: symmetry
zbMATH Keywords: fairness
zbMATH Keywords: revelation principle
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jmateco.2017.11.007
OpenAlex ID: W2775822722
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2017.11.007
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6836914