A differential game of industrial pollution management
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A differential game of industrial pollution management
zbMATH Open document ID: 0789.90103
DOI: 10.1007/BF02071062
published in: Annals of Operations Research
publication date: 1993-10-06T00:00:00Z
review text: A mathematical model of industrial pollution management is formulated in a differential game theoretical framework. The dynamics of the level of pollution is described by a differential equation governed by two decision makers, an entrepreneur and the government. The profit maximizing entrepreneur selects an output level. The government attempts to maximize utility from consumption and simultaneously to minimize disutility from pollution by charging a pollution tax rate on output. A feedback Nash equilibrium is derived. The relationship between the equilibrium strategies and model parameters are examined. The results are developed for an infinite horizon and extended to the multiple firms case.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A23
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B76
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B62
zbMATH DE Number: 422770
zbMATH Keywords: industrial pollution management
zbMATH Keywords: entrepreneur
zbMATH Keywords: government
zbMATH Keywords: feedback Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: infinite horizon
author: David W. K. Yeung
reviewed by: N. N. Subbotina
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: On Partial Equilibrium in a Queuing System with Two Servers
cites work: The control of environmental pollution and optimal investment and employment decisions
cites work: Identification of classes of differential games for which the open loop is a degenerate feedback Nash equilibrium
cites work: Necessary uses of abstract set theory in finite mathematics
cites work: Dynamic noncooperative game theory
cites work: Differential game models in management science
cites work: Q4090158
cites work: The Control of environmental pollution and optimal investment and employment decisions: A COmment
full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02071062
OpenAlex ID: W1967795292
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 422770