Acyclic and positive responsive social choice with infinite individuals. An alternative `invisible dictator' theorem
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Acyclic and positive responsive social choice with infinite individuals. An alternative `invisible dictator' theorem
zbMATH Open document ID: 0786.90003
DOI: 10.1016/0304-4068(93)90022-D
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 1993-12-02T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 429100
zbMATH Keywords: Arrovian impossibility theorem
zbMATH Keywords: infinite individuals
zbMATH Keywords: acyclicity
author: Ryo-Ichi Nagahisa
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 429100