Communication of preferences in contests for contracts
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Communication of preferences in contests for contracts
zbMATH Open document ID: 1262.91084
author: Todd R. Kaplan
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2012-11-28T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
zbMATH DE Number: 6110847
zbMATH Keywords: contests
zbMATH Keywords: procurement
zbMATH Keywords: communication
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-010-0525-2
OpenAlex ID: W2094188092
Wikidata QID: Q57920628
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-010-0525-2
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6110847