The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences
zbMATH Open document ID: 1263.91013
author: Shurojit Chatterji
author: Souvik Roy
author: Arunava Sen
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2012-11-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 6111202
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: lexicographically separable preferences
zbMATH Keywords: generalized random dictatorship
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jmateco.2012.08.001
OpenAlex ID: W2130212269
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2012.08.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6111202