General properties of long-run supergames
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: General properties of long-run supergames
zbMATH Open document ID: 1261.91006
author: Jérôme Renault
author: Tristan Tomala
published in: Dynamic Games and Applications
publication date: 2012-12-04T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: signalsjrttcorrect.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 6112477
zbMATH Keywords: repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: signals
zbMATH Keywords: folk theorem
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2165185825
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DOI: 10.1007/S13235-011-0018-3
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6112477