The impact of social ignorance on weighted congestion games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The impact of social ignorance on weighted congestion games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1262.91008
author: Dimitris Fotakis
author: Vasilis Gkatzelis
author: A. C. Kaporis
author: P. G. Spirakis
published in: Theory of Computing Systems
publication date: 2012-12-06T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 6113525
zbMATH Keywords: algorithmic game theory
zbMATH Keywords: congestion games
zbMATH Keywords: price of anarchy
Wikidata QID: Q59818423
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00224-011-9355-2
OpenAlex ID: W1999100735
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DBLP publication ID: journals/mst/FotakisGKS12
DOI: 10.1007/S00224-011-9355-2
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6113525