Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
zbMATH Open document ID: 1127.91327
author: Jean-Pierre Benoît
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2002-09-18T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 1802301
zbMATH Keywords: social choice
zbMATH Keywords: strategyproofness
zbMATH Keywords: lotteries
zbMATH Keywords: Gibbard
zbMATH Keywords: Satterthwaite
zbMATH Keywords: ties
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.2001.2794
OpenAlex ID: W2009554685
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2001.2794
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1802301