Strategy-proof location on a network
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategy-proof location on a network
zbMATH Open document ID: 1027.91022
author: James Schummer
author: Rakesh V. Vohra
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2002-09-18T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 1253.pdf
review text: A problem of location on a graph is considered. The preferences of agents are supposed single-peaked and inversely related to distances from a most prefered point on the graph. A social choice rule is a function mapping the lists of agents' peaks into points on the graph. The strategy proof rules are considered, i.e. it is assumed that an agent can not manipulate the choice by misreporting his preferences to it. If the graph is a tree, then the class of strategy-proof, onto rules are proved to be extended medium voter schemes. If however the graph contains at least one cycle, the class of strategy proof, onto rules grant some agent an amount of decision power. The results for cyclic graphs are partially negative and partially positive: one agent acts as a dictator on or between all cycles on the graph, but excercises more limited power on the other parts of the graph.
reviewed by: Antanas Žilinskas
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B10
zbMATH DE Number: 1802318
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proof
zbMATH Keywords: single-peaked preferences
zbMATH Keywords: graphs
zbMATH Keywords: location
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1970301801
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2001.2807
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1802318