The value of information in oligopoly with demand uncertainty
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The value of information in oligopoly with demand uncertainty
zbMATH Open document ID: 1019.91007
DOI: 10.1007/BF02339579
author: Dan Sasaki
published in: Journal of Economics
publication date: 2003-09-24T00:00:00Z
review text: Consider a duopoly game in normal form, where demand is linear but unknown. Cost is also linear. Consider the Bayes-Nash equilibria of such a game. The main result of the paper is that the value of information is superadditive among the players if the game is supermodular. An analogous result for subadditive/submodular also holds.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 1802499
zbMATH Keywords: strategic complementarity
zbMATH Keywords: superadditive value of information
zbMATH Keywords: supermodular game
zbMATH Keywords: Bayes-Nash equilibria
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Duopolists don't wish to share information
cites work: Information Sharing in Oligopoly
cites work: Information Transmission--Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria
cites work: The values of information in some nonzero sum games
cites work: Strategic Information Revelation
cites work: The value of information in a simple duopoly model
cites work: Exchange of Cost Information in Oligopoly
cites work: Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1802499