Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1013.91043
author: Sushil Bikhchandani
author: Philip Haile
author: John G. Riley
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2002-09-30T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 1809659
zbMATH Keywords: perfect Bayesian equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: English auctions
zbMATH Keywords: multiple equilibria
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3121869879
cites work: Identification of Standard Auction Models
cites work: Equilibria in open common value auctions
cites work: Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem
cites work: Optimality and robustness of the English auction
cites work: Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
cites work: A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
cites work: Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales
DOI: 10.1006/GAME.2001.0879
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1809659