(Sophisticated) stable sets in exchange economies
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: (Sophisticated) stable sets in exchange economies
zbMATH Open document ID: 1018.91007
author: Joseph Greenberg
author: Xiao Luo
author: Reza Oladi
author: Benyamin Shitovitz
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2002-09-30T00:00:00Z
review text: Given a pure exchange economy, two spaces can be considered -- the allocation space and its corresponding utility space. The authors demonstrate that the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set in the allocation space may differ from that in the corresponding utility space. They define a sophicated version of the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set by following Harsanyi's idea and show that the solution with respect to these two spaces coincide.
reviewed by: Chih Chang
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B54
zbMATH DE Number: 1809696
zbMATH Keywords: von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set
zbMATH Keywords: NTU games
zbMATH Keywords: pure exchange economy
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: game.2001.0890
OpenAlex ID: W1992818571
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cites work: Theory of games and economic behavior.
DOI: 10.1006/GAME.2001.0890
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1809696