Rule evolution and equilibrium selection
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Rule evolution and equilibrium selection
zbMATH Open document ID: 1030.91009
author: Wei-Torng Juang
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2002-09-30T00:00:00Z
review text: The paper studies rule evolution and its effect on selection between strict equilibria. If the agents cannot change rules, equilibrium selection is determined by the relative frequency of agents making investigations with two rules: the myopic best response and naive imitation. When the agents can only change rules through mutation, the efficient equilibrium weakly dominates the risk-dominant one. If the agents can change rules by updating, then the efficient equilibrium strictly dominates the risk-dominant one.
reviewed by: Stefan Mititelu
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
zbMATH DE Number: 1809697
zbMATH Keywords: rule evolution
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium selection
zbMATH Keywords: myopic best response
zbMATH Keywords: naive imitation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: game.2001.0894
OpenAlex ID: W2068991435
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DOI: 10.1006/GAME.2001.0894
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1809697