Unique stability in simple coalition formation games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Unique stability in simple coalition formation games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1093.91003
author: Szilvia Pápai
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2005-02-16T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 1537.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 2134326
zbMATH Keywords: matching
zbMATH Keywords: core
zbMATH Keywords: strategy proofness
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2070220449
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2003.09.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2134326