Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views
zbMATH Open document ID: 1085.91002
author: Philip J. Reny
author: Arthur Robson
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2005-02-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
zbMATH DE Number: 2134327
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2003.09.009
OpenAlex ID: W2144085792
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2003.09.009
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2134327