An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
zbMATH Open document ID: 1121.91007
author: D. Kharzeev
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2005-02-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A65
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
zbMATH DE Number: 2134338
zbMATH Keywords: Stackelberg duopoly
zbMATH Keywords: Experiments
zbMATH Keywords: Observation costs
zbMATH Keywords: Commitment
zbMATH Keywords: Costly leader games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2004.04.005
OpenAlex ID: W3125366649
cites work: Commitment and observability in games
cites work: Games with imperfectly observable commitment
cites work: Imperfectly observable commitments in \(n\)-player games
cites work: Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
cites work: Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
cites work: Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
cites work: DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE
cites work: The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2004.04.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2134338