Successful uninformed bidding
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Successful uninformed bidding
zbMATH Open document ID: 1085.91021
author: Ángel Hernando-Veciana
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2005-02-16T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 25363.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 2134379
zbMATH Keywords: Multi-unit auctions
zbMATH Keywords: Common value
zbMATH Keywords: Asymmetric bidders
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2571875626
cites work: Equilibria in open common value auctions
cites work: A sequential auction involving asymmetrically-informed bidders
cites work: Competitive bidding and proprietary information
cites work: Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
cites work: Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
cites work: The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
cites work: Optimal Auction Design
cites work: The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2003.09.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2134379