Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments
zbMATH Open document ID: 1072.91553
author: Suresh Mutuswami
author: David Pérez-Castrillo
author: David Wettstein
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2005-02-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
zbMATH DE Number: 2134383
zbMATH Keywords: Implementation
zbMATH Keywords: Local public goods
zbMATH Keywords: Bidding
zbMATH Keywords: Networks
zbMATH Keywords: Shapley value
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2003.08.003
OpenAlex ID: W1977723709
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2003.08.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2134383