Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies
zbMATH Open document ID: 1085.91036
author: James Schummer
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2005-02-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B54
zbMATH DE Number: 2134386
zbMATH Keywords: Strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: Almost dominant strategy
zbMATH Keywords: \(\varepsilon\)-dominant
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2003.08.002
OpenAlex ID: W2000054554
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2003.08.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2134386