Informal communication
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Informal communication
zbMATH Open document ID: 1181.91042
author: Wojciech Olszewski
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2005-02-09T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 2132874
zbMATH Keywords: sender-receiver games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2003.09.004
OpenAlex ID: W4243738808
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2003.09.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2132874